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CASE COMMENT:
Hasan v. 260 Wellesley Residence Ltd.
and Local Registrar
PAUL RAPSEY
R SUME
L'auteur sugg~re qu'il n'y a pas de meilleure raison d'imposer au locataire les
risques d'un transfert de titre ou d'intdrt d'un lieu d'habitation soumis une
convention de location plut6t qu'au propridtaire successeur. II sugg~re que le
propri6taire successeur est dans une meilleure position pour assumer ces risques
et pour prot6ger ses int6rts. Cet article porte principalement sur la question de
la responsabilit6 d6volue k un propridtaire successeur de rendre compte du d6p6t
de garantie pr6vu par la loi qui est vers6 au prdc6dent propridtaire. Cette question
est 6galement abordde dans le contexte de la responsabilit6 du d6labrement des
lieux attribuable A l'administration du pr6c6dent propri~taire.
INTRODUCTION
This case comment deals with the recent Divisional Court decision in Hasan v.
260 Wellesley Residence Ltd. and Local Registrar.1 The case raised an issue
which has long been the subject of both formal and informal law reform
submissions to the Attorney General by tenant advocates. The issue is that of
the scope of a local registrar's jurisdiction to issue orders under Part IV of the
Landlord and Tenant Act 2 (hereinafter the LTA).
Paul Rapsey is a research lawyer for the Ontario Legal Aid Plan's Clinic Resource Of-
fice, (the CRO) Toronto. He is the Editor of the Landlord and Tenant Case Index, a quar-
terly publication produced by the CRO. The publication indexes, summarizes and
provides commentaries on reported and unreported residential landlord and tenant juris-
prudence. There are presently over 1,250 decisions summarized in the Index. The com-
ments are those of the author and not of the CRO.
1. (27 June 1995) #32/95 (Ont. Div. Ct.) [hereinafter Hasan].
2. R.S.O. 1990, c. L-7 [hereinafter the LTA].
(1995) 11 Journal of Law and Social Policy
The law of residential tenancies in Ontario is seldom on the cutting edge of
significant jurisprudence. 3 A review of thousands of court decisions, both
reported and largely unreported, demonstrates that this is not an area of law with
which the courts are comfortable.
Despite early hopes that remedial statutory amendments to the feudal-based
common law would be taken seriously,4 ignorance of or disinterest in the
statutory scheme is all too commonly apparent in judicial decisions under Part
IV of the LTA.
Part of the blame is the statute itself. It is replete with gaps, intentional or not.
Of particular note is the absence of rules governing many matters of a procedural
nature.5 Because residential LTA proceedings are summary applications, they
are neither fish nor fowl on the palate of legal fine dining.
Due to the absence of comprehensive rules governing the entire process, the
court administration treats LTA proceedings differently from one locality to the
next. Local judges issue local practice directives without apparent regard to the
statute or to the practice in other regions or localities. 6 Only in Ottawa has there
been an attempt by the senior judge to bring about an element of consistency. 7
This was achieved by a bench and bar committee with representatives of both the
landlord and tenant bar involved in the process of drafting guidelines for the court.
The LTA was amended in 1975 to permit local registrars to grant default
judgments. 8 Section 113(7) sets out the local registrars' jurisdiction in this
3. One early and notable exception was the reference to the Supreme Court of Canada in
Reference Re (Ontario) Residential Tenancies Act, 1979, [1981 ] 1 S.C.R. 714. That de-
cision addressed the history of residential tenancy law and the constitutional context of
an attempt to transfer jurisdiction over landlord and tenant disputes from the superior
courts to a provincially constituted administrative tribunal.
4. See for example, Re Baker and Hayward (1977), 16 O.R. (2d) 695 (C.A.).
5. There is no general agreement with respect to whether the LTA procedure under Part IV
is entirely self-sufficient. This issue is too complex to address here. Decisions such as
Re Milicevic and Cann (8 August 1990), Middlesex #10100 (Ont. Dist. Ct.) and Re
Nick Carter Properties and Elves (17 October 1989), Peterborough # 4042/89 (Ont.
Dist. Ct.) have held that there are gaps in the procedure. Without careful analysis , other
decisions have held that there are no gaps: e.g., Re Venice Park Developments Ltd. and
Craddock (1989), 70 O.R. (2d) 303 (H.C.J.).
6. E.g., the senior judge for the Ontario Central East Region has issued a practice direction
concerning costs in applications and motions which is applied to summary applications
under the LTA without regard to the concept that summary applications are intended to
be inexpensive proceedings.
7. Landlord and Tenant Proceedings in Ottawa: A Guide for the Duty Judge (May 1993).
8. S.O. 1975 (2nd Sess.), c.13.
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regard. 9 With increasing regularity, despite the absence of express statutory
authority to do so, many local registrars have been awarding costs and disburse-
ments to landlords.
The LTA permits a tenant to "dispute" a landlord's application. The term
"dispute" is not defined. Section 113(5) indicates that a dispute may be in writing
or may be by appearance at the court office.1 0 Despite s.113(5) of the LTA, a
recent Toronto Directive ordered that registrars should enquire as to the nature
of a dispute and are instructed that requests for time to pay should not be
considered to be disputes."I In some localities, local registrars have conducted
mini-hearings with the landlord and tenant present rather than sending the matter
to a hearing before a judge as required by the statute.
BACKGROUND FACTS
Hasan was allegedly in arrears of rent. She vacated the premises by the time of
the first return date before the local registrar. She attended on the return date
and gave the registrar a written dispute on the basis of requesting relief against
forfeiture. Hasan also disputed the amount of arrears. The registrar did not set
this matter down for a hearing. The landlord claimed in excess of $480 arrears.
The registrar struck this out and entered judgment for $32. The registrar also
awarded costs and disbursements against the tenant.
Hasan did not feel that she had been treated fairly. She attended at a local
community legal aid clinic for advice. On the basis that the registrar had
exceeded her jurisdiction, Hasan was advised to apply to court for a remedy.
The question was what remedy was available. The LTA provides for the remedy
of a motion without notice for an order setting aside a "default judgment". 12
However, since the tenant appeared, arguably this could not have been a default
9. LTA, s. 113(7) Where the claim of the applicant is not disputed, the local registrar may
sign an order declaring the tenancy agreement terminated, or directing that a writ of
possession issue or may give judgment for the amount of arrears of rent, or for the
amount of compensation under section 112 or for the return of the security deposit and
interest thereon or for an abatement of rent or any of them, in accordance with the
claim.
10. LTA, s. 113(5) The respondent may dispute the applicant's claim by attending on the re-
turn of the application or by filing with the local registrar before the day for the return
of the application a statement in writing setting out briefly the grounds upon which the
respondent disputes the applicant's claim.
11. Memorandum from Gibson J., dated June 1, 1993. A request for time to pay is in the
nature of a claim for relief against forfeiture which the tenant has a right to request
under s. 113(1)(g) and the court has a residual discretion to consider under s. 121 (2)(a).
12. LTA, s.113(8).
(1995) 11 Journal of Law and Social Policy
judgment as contemplated by the LTA. As such, that remedy under the LTA would
not available to Hasan.13
On the basis that no other remedy was available to her, Hasan brought an
application for judicial review of the decision of the local registrar under the
Judicial Review Procedure Act, 14 (hereinafter the JRPA). A Notice of Constitu-
tional Question was served because the matter raised an issue under s.96 of the
Constitution Act, 1867.15
INTERLOCUTORY DECISION
The local registrar was represented by the Attorney General of Ontario. The
Attorney General brought a motion in Divisional Court to strike the application
for judicial review on the grounds that the appropriate remedy was a motion to
set aside the order of the registrar under s.113(8) of the LTA. 16 On the motion,
the Divisional Court ruled that s. 113(7) allows the registrar to grant a remedy
under the LTA where the claim is not disputed. Section 113(8) permits the tenant
to move to set aside a registrar's order made under s. 113(7). It does not permit
a motion to set aside a registrar's order if it is not made under s.113(7). The
Court concluded that the registrar was prima facie without jurisdiction to have
granted the order in this case. As such judicial review was held to be the
appropriate remedy. 17
The Attorney General did not appeal that order. Rather, in the main proceeding,
the Attorney General applied to have that order set aside.1 8
13. This was White J.'s conclusion on the Attorney General's motion to strike the applica-
tion in Hasan, supra, note 1.
14. R.S.O. 1990, c.J-1.
15. The issue of the registrar's jurisdiction to award costs and grant default judgments
raised the spectre of whether the provincially appointed registrar was impinging on the
exclusive jurisdiction of federally appointed judges under s.96 of the Constitution Act,
1867, formerly the British North America Act. This issue has been addressed by the Su-
preme Court of Canada in several decisions and notably in Reference Re (Ontario) Res-
idential Tenancies Act, 1979, supra, note 3.
16. LTA, s. 113(8) Where the local registrar signs an order or judgment under subsection
(7), the respondent may, within seven days after the service thereof, by motion, without
notice, apply to the judge to have the order or judgment set aside and the judge may so
order upon being satisfied that reasonable grounds for dispute exist.
17. Hasan v. 260 Wellesley Residence LtdL (4 April 1995), #32/95 (Ontario Div. Ct.), per
White J.
18. The Local Registrar brought a cross-application in the main judicial review proceedings
to have this decision set aside. There is no jurisdiction to do so in this case. The proper
remedy was by way of appeal. In the main application, the Court disagreed with White
J. and held that the proper and preferable remedy was a motion to set aside under
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THE FINAL DECISION
In essence there were four issues which the Court determined. The Constitu-
tional Question was only addressed in an aside.
1. Was there a valid dispute by the tenant under s.113(5)?
2. Did the registrar have jurisdiction to deal with the matter?
3. Did the registrar have jurisdiction to award costs and disbursements?
4. Was a motion for setting aside the order under s. 113(8) the appropriate
remedy?
A. Dispute
The Court held that since the tenant appeared in person, the fact that she also
brought a written dispute was irrelevant. 19 Once a tenant appears and advises
the registrar that he or she is opposing the landlord's application, the registrar
must refer the matter to a judge.20
B. Jurisdiction to treat as default judgment
The Court held that when the various provisions of s. 113 are read as a whole, the
registrar's function is intended to be merely clerical21 and that a more expansive
interpretation of the registrar's power under s.113(7) would work a fundamental
unfairness upon tenants who seek to dispute claims. 22 The Court held that the local
registrar had conducted a mini-hearing.2 3 It found that the legislature did not intend
to allow registrars to weed out so-called "non-existent" disputes.24
s.113(8) and (9). According to counsel for the tenant, the Court, in oral comment, held
that a single judge of the Divisional Court was an "inferior tribunal" to a panel of three
judges of the Divisional Court. As such, the Court felt it had jurisdiction to set aside the
order. However, quite apart from the jurisdictional issue, the Divisional Court did not
set aside White J.'s decision as it held it was not relevant in view of its finding. More-
over, the written reasons contain none of this commentary. I suggest that this means
White J.'s order still stands. There are now two conflicting Divisional Court rulings on
the same issue.
19. Hasan, supra, note I at 10. The written dispute did not comply with s.113(5) as it had
not been "[filed] with the local registrar before the day for the return of the applica-
tion": i.e., the tenant brought it with her on that date.
20. Ibid. at 29.
21. Ibid. at 15-16; see also at 20-23.
22. Ibid. at 16-17.
23. Ibid. at 12.
24. Ibid. at 18; see also at 28.
(1995) 11 Journal of Law and Social Policy
The Court ruled that when a registrar signs an order or gives judgment under
s. 113(7), she/he is exercising jurisdiction reserved historically to s.96 courts. 25
"Weeding" out claims is reserved for s.96 judges. 26 In enacting s. 113(7), the
legislature intended to restrict the registrar's role to a clerical one. Indeed, were
it otherwise, the Court expressed serious reservations about the constitutional
validity of the provision. 27
C. Jurisdiction to award costs and disbursements
The Court held that the Courts of Justice Act 28, makes it clear that, subject to
certain exceptions, costs are a matter for the court.29 A local registrar is not "the
court" because she/he has no adjudicative function. 30
The Attorney General argued that s.106(5) gave the local registrar jurisdiction
over costs. 3 1 However, the Court held that s. 106(5) would be too roundabout a
way for the legislature to grant jurisdiction to the registrar in the matter of costs. 32
The Court concluded that the local registrar had no jurisdiction to award costs or
disbursements under s. 113(7) and that she exceeded her jurisdiction by doing so.
D. Remedy
The Court agreed that the local registrar was engaged in a "statutory power of
decision" as required by the JRPA.33 Therefore, in appropriate circumstances,
25. E.g., the Constitution Act, 1867. The Court cited Reference Re (Ontario) Residential
Tenancies Act, 1979, supra, note 3.
26. Hasan, supra, note 1 at 18-19.
27. Ibid. at 23.
28. R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43 [hereinafter the CJA].
29. Hasan, supra, note 1 at 30.
30. Ibid. at 30-3 1. Section 81 of the CJA states:
81. Where an adjudicative function is given by an Act to a judge or officer of a court in
Ontario, the jurisdiction shall be deemed to be given to the court.
The Court commented that if the LTA did purport to give an adjudicative function to
local registrars of the nature claimed by the Attorney General, then it would be uncon-
stitutional.
31. LTA, s.106(5) Where application is brought by the landlord under s. 113 and the tenant
at any time before the order is final pays into court all the arrears and the costs of the
application, the application is forever stayed.
32. E.g., s. 105(6) allows for the payment into court of costs by the respondent. It is not a
provision granting jurisdiction to assess and compel the payment of costs. Moreover, it
has been judicially restricted to the payment of filing fees in a well-reasoned judgment
in Re Morris and Dupere (14 November 1991), Windsor #91-GD- 18242 (O.C.J.).
33. Hasan, supra, note 1 at 35.
Case Comment
that decision would be reviewable by way of judicial review. However, the Court
held that when the registrar was acting, she was purporting to act under s. 113(7)
and this provision clearly "cloaked her with jurisdiction" to sign judgment.
Although she erred in construing the scope of her jurisdiction, this did not render
her decision a nullity. The Court held that the registrar's decision was not void
ab initio. Therefore, resort may be had to s. 13(8).34 The Court held that s. 113(8)
provides an adequate, if not superior, alternate remedy to that of judicial review.
IMPLICATIONS
Subject to the later comments, as a result of this decision:
* tenants need only appear and oppose the application to have the right
to a trial before a judge; and
registrars may no longer order costs or disbursements.
There are several practical benefits to holding that the remedy under s. 113(8) is
available in this situation. This procedure does not cost the tenant any further
filing fee, it is brought without notice, and, in some locales, does not require the
presence of the tenant.35 The motions judge must still be satisfied that "reason-
able grounds for dispute exist". 36 Further, subject to the discretion to extend the
time for bringing the motion 37, the tenant only has seven days after service of
the registrar's order to bring the motion for set aside.3 8
However, because orders by registrars which violate these rights are only
voidable, rather than void ab initio, they remain valid unless challenged. Rarely
will tenants be in a position to challenge these actions. That is especially true of
awards of costs which are issued when the tenant does not appear.
34. In other words, the decision remained good until it was quashed or set aside.
35. E.g., the judge dispenses with the matter in chambers on the basis of the written mate-
rial before him or her.
36. Supra, note 16.
37. Section 113(9) states:
The judge may extend the time for bringing the motion under subsection (8) upon being
satisfied that a proper case has been made for doing so.
The Divisional Court, in Hasan, supra, note 1, gave a very strong signal that an ex-
tension should be granted where the order has been made without jurisdiction. How-
ever, normally an extension of time is only granted where there is good reason for the
delay. It is not normally granted on the basis of the error.
38. There is no time limit for judicial review applications. The decision of the Divisional
Court suggests that if, for example, an extension of time were not granted, judicial re-
view may be available.
(1995) 11 Journal of Law and Social Policy
The determination regarding whether the decision was void seems to be a
political policy decision and not a legal one despite the attempt to give it an air
of legality. If the decision was a nullity, then a great many, if not most, orders
by local registrars in the past 20 years would be potentially null. It is likely that
this concern was in the minds of the Court when it rendered the decision.
CONCLUSION
To state that the decision remains good until set aside or quashed is to effect an
injustice on the many unrepresented tenants who do not have access to the
courts. Effectively the court is giving registrars permission to continue with an
illegality and saying its alright if they don't get caught.
I suggest that the Divisional Court decision brings the administration of justice
into disrepute. The Court made its decision with respect to the issue of voidness
based on a line of jurisprudence following the English decision in Ridge v.
Baldwin.39
That decision held that to make a decision "void ab initio there must be some
condition precedent to the conferment of authority on the committee which has
not been fulfilled."'40 That court makes a distinction between "a wrong exercise
of jurisdiction which a judge has and a usurpation of a jurisdiction which he has
not".
4 1
Justice is not done, contrary to the Court's professed reliance on Ridge v.
Baldwin42 and other authorities, where an order made without jurisdiction
remains valid unless challenged. Moreover, the Court missed an important
point: i.e., a condition precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction was missing:
i.e., the application was not undisputed. I suggest, therefore, that according to
the very decision the Divisional Court has relied on, the decision should be void
ab initio rather than simply voidable.
39. [1964] AC 40 (C.A.).
40. Ibid. at 138-9.
41. Ibid. at 140-1.
42. Supra, note 39.
